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We define generalized quantum games by introducing the coherent payoff operators and propose
a simple scheme to illustrate it. The scheme is implemented with a single spin qubit system and
two entangled qubit system. The Nash Equilibrium Theorem is proved for the models.
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INTRODUCTION
As a new vehicle to explore the exotic natures of quantum information[1], quantum games were proposed as the
”quantization” of the classical games[2, 3, 4]. Most recently a quantum game was implemented via nuclear magnetic
resonance (NMR) system[5]. It was demonstrated that neither of the two players would win the game if they play
rationally, but if they adopt quantum strategies both of them would win. A classical game [6], as is well known,
consists of three elements - the players, the strategies taken by the players and the payoff functions. In a gambling
process, a player takes a strategy without knowing the strategy adopted by the other players. All players having
taken actions simultaneously or successively, the payoff is awarded to each player according to the payoff function,
which depends on the actions of all of the players. If a player can maximize his payoff, one says he wins the game.
The early ”quantization” of classical game is to replace the classical strategy space with the quantum one consisting
of unitary operations on a quantum state. In the ordinary two player quantum game, one takes as the initial quantum
state an entangled state (EPR state [7]correlating two qubits in a distance and the players can take as strategies local
unitary operations acting on the two qubits separately. The payoff functions are defined by the probabilities, rather
than the probability amplitudes, of projecting the final state to some chosen states. For this reason, we think this
definition of quantum game is incoherent. As in this ”semi-classical game theory ”, the payoff function is based on
the classical probability to a large extent, there is a fundamental interest in generalizing it to a ”fully-quantum game
theory ”.
In this note we make two generalizations. First, we introduce the coherent payoff functions in terms of certain
probability amplitudes. Second, we loosen the requirement that the initial state be an entangled qubit state. With
these generalizations, we can still prove the Nash Equilibrium Theorem [8]for a special type of quantum games,
including single qubit case and two entangled qubit case. Notice that the existence of Nash equilibrium is an essential
element in defining an interesting game. But it seems that this point has not been fully realized. Indeed, in some
proposed quantum games, while new features have been demonstrated, Nash equilibrium appears to occur accidentally
for specifically-chosen parameters. A most recent work concerns the universality of the Nash theorem [9], but it
requires a very large quantum strategy space that consists of both unitary transformations and non-unitary ”quantum
measurement ” operations. Naturally, Nash equilibrium is more likely to occur in a bigger strategy space. However,
from the practical point of view, it is desirable to introduce a reasonable quantum game in a limited strategy space
with Nash equilibrium whose existence is not the result of carefully choosing parameters. Anyway, it should be
possible to implement by practically physical processes.
GENERALIZED QUANTUM GAMES
Let us describe the scheme of our generalized N player quantum game in a general framework. Fix a vector
space V . Then mathematically the game is a triple (S, ρ, P ) where ρ ∈ End(V ) being a density matrix, S =
(S1, S2, · · · , SN ) , Si ⊂ End(V ) consisting of unitary operators, and P = (P1,P2,..., PN ), Pi ∈ End(V ) being an
Hermitian operator, called a payoff operator. For a given quantum state described by a density matrix ρ ,the players
transform it by operations Ui ∈ Si (i = 1, 2, · · · , N) simultaneously for a static type game or in succession for a
2dynamic type game. Based on the obtained final state
ρf = (
N∏
k=1
Uk)ρ(
N∏
k=1
Uk)
† (1)
the payoff fi for the i’th player is calculated according to the formula
fi = Tr(Piρf ) ∈ R (2)
Notice that in this generalized version, the operations Uk are not required to be localized and so [Uk,Us] = 0 (s 6= k)is
not necessarily true. When [ρf , Pi] 6= 0 or [Uk, Pi] 6= 0,the role of the off-diagonal elements in ρf and Pk reflect the
quantum coherence character of the payoff function. Notice that quantum coherence plays crucial role in quantum
computing and quantum information, but it is sensitive to quantum meaurement [10] and any evironment-couplings
with it [11].
The above described N player game includes the original quantum game as a special case. In that case, an
N-multiple entangled pure state |σ〉 ∈ V = V1⊗V2⊗ ...⊗VN is used as an initial state. Here, Vk is the space under the
action of the operation Uk by the k’th player. One necessarily has [Uk,Us] = 0 and |σ〉 is transformed by independent
operations Uk simultaneously in different spatial locations. The payoff
fk(σ) =
∑
j1,j2,...,j
C
[k]
j1,j2,...,j2
|〈σj1σj2,...σjN |E〉|2 (3)
for each player is calculated based on the probabilities |〈σj1σj2,...σjN |E〉|2 for projections of final state |E〉 =
U1U2,...UN |σ〉 onto the basis |σj1σj2,...σjN 〉.Here, C [k]j1,j2,...,j2 are the real parameters assigned for a given game. Ob-
viously, it is a special case of our generalized version with the payoff matrix
Pk =
∑
j1,j2,...,j
C
[k]
j1,j2,...,j2
|σj1σj2,...σjN 〉〈σj1σj2,...σjN | (4)
and the initial density matrix ρ = |σ〉 〈σ| .
Next we consider two models of the above generalized quantum game with single qubit and two entangled qubits,
in which the Nash theorem holds. For convenience, we start from an abstract classical game called GAME A defined
on a subset of S1 × S1 : {(θ, ϕ)|0 ≤ θ, ϕ ≤ pi2}. We will show that the two generalized games are mathematically
equivalent to the GAME A. So we need only to see whether the Nash theorem holds universally for the GAME A.
CLASSICAL ABSTRACT GAME WITH NASH EQUILIBRIUM ON S1 × S1
The GAME A is described as follows. The two players have the strategy spaces
{
θ|0 ≤ θ ≤ pi2
} ⊂ S1 and{
ϕ|0 ≤ ϕ ≤ pi2
} ⊂ S1respectively. The pay off function for the i− th player can be written in the form
fi (θ, ϕ) = pi + qi sin (θ + ϕ+Ψi) (5)
where qi > 0 and Ψi ∈
[−pi2 , pi2 ] .
Proposition. For Game A, there exists a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. We imitate the proof of Nash Equilibrium Theorem. From the conditions 0 ≤ θ, ϕ ≤ pi2 and Ψ1 ∈
[−pi2 , pi2 ]
we observe that for a fixed ϕ there exists exactly one θ, which we denote by χ (ϕ) , that maximizes the pay off
function f1. Similarly, for a fixed θ there is exactly one ϕ, which we denote by κ (θ) , that maximizes the pay off
function f2. So we can define a map g from the convex set
[
0, pi2
]× [0, pi2 ] to itself such that
g (θ, ϕ) = (χ (ϕ) ,κ (θ)) . (6)
It is easy to show that g is a continuous map. Hence, by Brower Fixed Point Theorem g has a fixed point (θ0, ϕ0) .
It is readily verified that (θ0, ϕ0) is a Nash equilibrium. The proof of the proposition is thus completed.
The Nash equilibrium of GAME A can actually be calculated explicitly. The results, depending on the values of
Ψ1 and Ψ2, are as follows.Suppose Ψ1 = Ψ2 = Ψ. Then the Nash equilibrium might not be unique. If Ψ ∈
[−pi2 , 0],
3then each point (θ0, ϕ0) in
[−Ψ, pi2 ] × [−Ψ, pi2 ] satisfying θ0 + ϕ0 +Ψ = pi2 is a Nash equilibrium; If Ψ ∈ [0, pi2 ], then
each point (θ0, ϕ0) in
[
0, pi2 −Ψ
] × [0, pi2 −Ψ] satisfying θ0 + ϕ0 + Ψ = pi2 is a Nash equilibrium. Suppose Ψ1 6= Ψ2.
Then the Nash equilibrium is unique. Precisely, there are the following possibilities.
1) Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈
[−pi2 , 0] ,Ψ1 > Ψ2, (θ0, ϕ0) = (−Ψ1, pi2 ) ;
2) Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈
[−pi2 , 0] ,Ψ1 < Ψ2, (θ0, ϕ0) = (pi2 ,−Ψ2) ;
3) Ψ1 ∈
[−pi2 , 0] ,Ψ2 ∈ [0, pi2 ] , (θ0, ϕ0) = (pi2 , 0) ;
4) Ψ1 ∈
[
0, pi2
]
,Ψ2 ∈
[−pi2 , 0] , (θ0, ϕ0) = (0, pi2 ) ;
5) Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈
[
0, pi2
]
,Ψ1 > Ψ2, (θ0, ϕ0) =
(
0, pi2 −Ψ2
)
;
6) Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈
[
0, pi2
]
,Ψ1 < Ψ2, (θ0, ϕ0) =
(
pi
2 −Ψ1, 0
)
.
It is easy to prove these results. For example, when Ψ1,Ψ2 ∈
[−pi2 , 0] , we have
χ (ϕ) =
{
pi
2 , −pi2 ≤ ϕ+Ψ1 ≤ 0;
pi
2 − (ϕ+Ψ1), 0 ≤ ϕ+Ψ1 ≤ pi2 .
κ (θ) =
{
pi
2 , −pi2 ≤ θ +Ψ2 ≤ 0;
pi
2 − (θ +Ψ2), 0 ≤ θ +Ψ2 ≤ pi2 .
(7)
If Ψ1 > Ψ2, it then follows from the fixed point condition (χ (ϕ0) ,κ (θ0)) = (θ0, ϕ0) that (θ0, ϕ0) =
(−Ψ1, pi2 ) . The
other results can be proved in a similar way. We notice that when Ψ1 = Ψ2 , if the two players do not exchange
information, there is little chance of reaching a Nash equilibrium. On the other hand, when Ψ1 6= Ψ2, as the Nash
equilibrium is unique it will appear, but at the equilibrium at most only one player will maxize the payoff function.
ONE QUBIT REALIZATION
Now we consider the first realization of Game A only using one qubit, which is similar to the classical game of
roulette. Given an initial state ρ, the first player operates on it by a rotation
U (θ) =
(
cos θ − sin θ
sin θ cos θ
)
, (8)
and then the second player operates on the resulted state by another rotation U (ϕ) .Since the two operations U (θ)
and U (ϕ) take action in succession, this is a game of dynamic type. Assign two payoff matrices P1 and P2 to the
two players. By definition they are Hermitian operators. Generally, we can write
Pi =
(
ai bi
bi di
)
, i = 1, 2 (9)
with respect to the basis {|0〉 , |1〉} , where ai, di are real numbers. The complex elements bi characterize the quantum
coherence of the pay off functions fi (i = 1, 2) for the two players
fi = tr
(
PiU (θ + ϕ) ρU (θ + ϕ)
†
)
. (10)
To acquire the non-trivial nature of quantum coherence it should be required that [P1, P2] and [Pi, U (θ)] 6= 0.Otherwise
one can simultaneously diagonalize P1, P2 and U (θ) and the defined game would be trivial.
First, we take as the initial state the pure state
|ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉) (11)
of a qubit. Then we have
U (θ) |0〉 = cos θ |0〉+ sin θ |1〉 ,
U (θ) |1〉 = − sin θ |0〉+ cos θ |1〉 . (12)
After simple calculation we obtain
fi =
1
2
[(ai + di) + (ai − di) sin 2 (θ + ϕ)
+
(
bi + bi
)
cos 2 (θ + ϕ)]. (13)
4If ai − di ≥ 0 then fi can be rewritten as
fi = pi + qi sin (2 (θ + ϕ) + Ψi) , (14)
where
pi =
1
2
(ai + di) ,
qi =
1
2
√
(ai − di)2 +
(
bi + bi
)2
,
Ψi = arctan
(
bi + bi
)
(ai − di) . (15)
Clearly, if we put the restrictions ai − di ≥ 0 and 0 ≤ θ, ϕ ≤ pi4 then this quantum game is a realization of Game A.
Thus in this case it has a Nash equilibrium.
Next, we take the mixed state
ρ =
(
p 0
0 1− p
)
, 0 6 p 6 1 (16)
as the initial state. In this case we have
fi =
1
2
[(ai + di) + (1− 2p)
(
bi + bi
)
sin 2 (θ + ϕ)
+ (1− p) (di − ai) cos 2 (θ + ϕ)].
It does not harm to assume p 6 12 . Then if bi + bi > 0, fi can be rewritten as
fi = pi + qi sin (2 (θ + ϕ) + Ψi) ,
where
pi =
1
2
(ai + di) ,
qi =
1
2
√
(di − ai)2 (1− p)2 +
(
bi + bi
)2
(1− 2p)2, (17)
Ψi = arctan
(1− p) (di − ai)
(1− 2p) (bi + bi) .
Thus this game with the additional restriction 0 ≤ θ, ϕ ≤ pi4 is also a realization of GAME A.
TWO QUBIT REALIZATION
Our next model is a static quantum game with two qubits. We take the quantum entangled state
|φ〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 ⊗ |1〉+ |1〉 ⊗ |0〉) (18)
for a simple two qubit system. The two players independently operate on the first and the second qubits by the
above defined U (θ) and U (ϕ) respectively. Notice that, since the two local operations U1 (θ) = U (θ) ⊗ 1 and
U2 (ϕ) = 1⊗U (ϕ) can take action simultaneously or in succession, we can realize this two-bit game both in the static
and dynamic ways. As in the first model, two Hermitian payoff operators P1 and P2 are assigned to the two players
and the two pay off functions fi (i = 1, 2) are defined as
fi = tr
(
Pi (U (θ)⊗ U (ϕ)) |φ〉 〈φ| (U (θ)⊗ U (ϕ))†
)
. (19)
Suppose that Pi has the matrix representation
(Pi)kl = x
i
kl, x
i
kl = x
i
lk, k, l = 1, 2, 3, 4, (20)
5with respect to the basis
{|0〉 ⊗ |0〉 , |0〉 ⊗ |1〉 , |1〉 ⊗ |0〉 , |1〉 ⊗ |1〉} . (21)
Then by direct calculation we obtain
4fi =

 4∑
j=1
xijj + 2Rex
i
23 − 2Rexi14


+ (−xi11 + xi22 + xi33 − xi44
+ 2Rexi23 + 2Rex
i
14) cos 2 (θ + ϕ)
− 2(Rexi12 +Rexi13 +Rexi24
+Rexi34) sin 2 (θ + ϕ) . (22)
If
Rexi12 +Rex
i
13 +Rex
i
24 +Rex
i
34 ≤ 0, (23)
the pay off functions can be rewritten as
fi = pi + qi sin (2 (θ + ϕ) + Ψi) , (24)
where
pi =
1
4
(
4∑
j=1
xijj + 2Rex
i
23 − 2Rexi14),
qi = [
1
4
(−xi11 + xi22 + xi33 − xi44
+ 2Rexi23 + 2Rex
i
14)
2+
4
(
Rexi12 +Rex
i
13 +Rex
i
24 +Rex
i
34
)2
]1/2
Ψi = − arctan A
B
:
A = −xi11 + xi22 + xi33−
xi44 + 2Rex
i
23 + 2Rex
i
14
B = Rexi12 +Rex
i
13 +Rex
i
24 +Rex
i
34 (25)
Thus we conclude that this quantum game with the restrictions
Rexi12 +Rex
i
13 +Rex
i
24 +Rex
i
34 ≤ 0 (26)
and 0 ≤ θ, ϕ ≤ pi4 also realizes Game A.
REMARKS
In sum, we introduce in this paper a new type of quantum game and prove the Nash Equilibrium Theorem. We
also calculate the equilibrium explicitly. In the two models though ”coherent ” pay-off functions of quantum nature
are introduced, the universal existence of Nash equilibrium follows from the simple mathematical structure of the
classical Game A. In this sense, the game is not really quantized. On the other hand, this suggests the possibility of
studying quantum games from an abstract point of view, transcending concrete examples.
Finally we point out that the interesting examples introduced in this letter can easily be implemented in experiments.
For the above one-spin qubit model, the operation U (θ) can be realized as a Rabi rotation of angle θ around z-axe in
a spin procession experiment. If we take the two payoff matrices to be the Pauli matrices σz and σx respectively, then
the measurement of the payoff function is to see the average polarization of spin along x−axe and z−axe. Thus this
6quantum game is implementable by a qubit NMR quantum computing system[12], described as one nucleolus spin in
a magnetic field driven by a radio frequency (rf ) field. This system realizes a single qubit quantum logic gate.
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